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ABSTRACT 
The paper explores the impact of culture on anonymous inter- and intra-
cultural negotiations conducted via the Internet using a Web-based negotiation 
support system (NSS). In e-negotiations, technology acts as a moderator in the 
relationship between culture and negotiation behavior. This implies that patterns 
of cultural impact on negotiations can be different from face-to-face negotia-
tions. Communication technology reduces the transmission of social cues and 
increases the importance of explicit communication. Thus, cultural dimensions 
such as power distance, which rely on social cues, are reduced in their impact, 
while the impact of communication-related dimensions of cultures such as high 
vs. low context is amplified by the system. The empirical analysis of these effects 
is based on a set of bilateral negotiations involving 1366 participants carried out 
with the Web-based NSS Inspire. It indicates a significant influence of culture, 
particularly regarding negotiators’ expectations. We also found significant cul-
tural differences with regard to communication patterns emerging during the ne-
gotiation process and outcomes of negotiations. Our results also indicate that as 
the negotiation process progresses, individual differences between negotiators, 
including their approach to problem solving, become more important than their 
cultural characteristics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Information technology and in particu-
lar the Internet are creating a new situation for 
international negotiations. Geographically dis-
persed parties can get into direct contact and 
enter sophisticated negotiations (Kappeler 
1996; Studemeister 1998). This new technol-
ogy allows individuals and organizations from 
different cultures to negotiate with each other, 
without being aware of their partner's national-
ity or culture. One could argue that in the im-
personal world of electronic information ex-
change, the importance of cultural differences 
diminishes. Furthermore, the use of English as 
lingua franca could further reduce any cultural 
impact on negotiations. This paper approaches 
these issues from an empirical point of view 
and presents the results of a large set of ex-
periments conducted with the use of Web-
based negotiation support systems (NSS). The 
focus of the study is to determine if a cultural 
influence can still be detected in negotiations 
that are carried out anonymously, via a techni-
cal medium.  
The influence of culture on negotiations 
has been studied using various methods, in-
cluding case studies, laboratory and classroom 
experiments, and recently, experiments involv-
ing remote groups. Case studies of real-life 
negotiations allow for direct assessment of all 
the facets of sometimes very complex negotia-
tions (Gulliver 1979; Walker 1990; Faure and 
Rubin 1993). They provide rich material at the 
cost of the comparability of the results across 
negotiation problems and cultures. In contrast, 
laboratory and classroom experiments allow 
for a significant level of control over the prob-
lem and the environment in which it is solved 
(Graham 1985; Adler and Graham 1989; Roth 
1995; Graham and Mintu-Wimsatt 1997) but 
the authenticity of the task suffers.  
CONTRIBUTION 
The paper integrates the existing literature on cultural impacts on the use of information 
systems and on intercultural negotiations and—based on the analysis of electronic negotia-
tions—it extends the current research in several directions. By considering intercultural negotia-
tions, this paper builds on a large body of the existing literature on international negotiations. 
However, this literature rarely considers the impact of communication technology and analytical 
negotiation support systems on such negotiations. The present paper explicitly introduces tech-
nology as an intervening variable in the relationship between culture and negotiation processes. 
Previous research in information systems studied the impact of culture mainly in the con-
text of individual usage and adoption of information technology (IT) by users from different 
cultures. Case or field studies were used within a single culture in order to identify the impact of 
that specific culture on the process and its outcomes. Questions of intercultural use of IT were 
studied mainly in the context of group support systems (GSS), where both culturally homoge-
nous groups in different cultures and multicultural groups were studied. This paper looks at a 
different type of applications: namely, Web-based negotiation support systems (NSS) in a mul-
ticultural context. 
The paper adds to the existing research on intercultural negotiation in the consideration 
of 10 countries and the volume of empirical data. Previous empirical studies on intercultural 
negotiations were often based on experiments that used subjects available at a given location. 
The Inspire negotiations analyzed here were carried out by users from a wide range of cultures 
at their home institutions located. The sample size of 1366 negotiation records by far exceeds 
the amount of data available in most previous studies. 
The paper provides empirical insights into an area for which little theoretical and empiri-
cal research is available. It is an exploratory study, which can help to formulate questions for 
future, more focused research. From a practical point of view, it highlights the potential impact 
of culture on the way systems available on the Internet are used and thus underlines the neces-
sity of considering cultural factors in system design.
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Many experiments compare negotia-
tions conducted in culture X with negotiations 
conducted in culture Y (Adler, Graham and 
Gehrke 1987; Graham, Mintu and Rogers 
1994). Classroom experiments are typically 
brief and they are either repeated in different 
countries (Roth 1995) or involve both local 
and foreign students (Graham 1985; Adler and 
Graham 1989). Thus, they do not directly 
model international and inter-cultural negotia-
tions (Drake 1995). Only in a few studies, in-
tra-cultural negotiations are compared with 
cross-cultural ones (Adler and Graham 1989; 
Brett 1998).  
Experimental studies often use face-to-
face negotiations. This setting allows for natu-
ral and rich communication, but it also intro-
duces a bias since the subjects know the cul-
ture of their opponents and may try to modify 
their behavior to attune to their counterparts. 
Further, it is difficult to recruit participants 
who represent a foreign culture. Typically, the 
participants in the experiment are studying at 
the same university (Adler and Graham 1989) 
or live and work in the same area (Brett 1998). 
This paper uses a different approach to 
obtain empirical data on cross-cultural negotia-
tions. Our database was collected in the course 
of about five years. The negotiations were car-
ried out via an experimental Internet-based 
NSS Inspire (Kersten and Noronha 1999b). 
The design of the system allows for detailed 
logging of the negotiation process, as well as 
for administering questionnaires to participants 
before and after the negotiation. Negotiations 
carried out via Inspire differ in several aspects 
from previous inter-cultural negotiation ex-
periments, including the location of experi-
ments, time frame, medium and support, and 
anonymity. 
1. Face to face experiments carried out in 
one location use expatriates from other 
cultures. The exposure of foreign students 
and employees to the culture of the coun-
try they (temporarily) reside in may have 
an influence on their behaviour. Further-
more, by restricting participation to expa-
triates, a sample bias could be introduced. 
Participants use the Inspire system from 
their respective home institutions, so these 
potential sources of bias are avoided.  
2. The negotiations are conducted over sev-
eral weeks and the participants can termi-
nate or extend the negotiations. This is in 
contrast with the experimental face-to-
face negotiations, which are carried out in 
an unrealistically short period of time.  
3. Communication between the negotiators is 
performed via a Web-based system that 
allows for the exchange of both structured 
and unstructured information. The system 
includes support techniques allowing the 
participants to evaluate offers and counter-
offers, and to view the negotiation history 
in both tabular and graphical formats. 
Thus, while the communication medium is 
less rich than in face-to-face negotiations, 
the analytical support offered in Inspire is 
usually not available. 
4. The negotiations are carried out anony-
mously. Therefore, participants are ini-
tially not aware of their partners’ cultures. 
They may reveal their identity and nation-
ality to others if they wish to do so. How-
ever, the negotiators cannot verify their 
counterparts’ identity disclosure. The ab-
sence of cues should reduce the influence 
of stereotypes and biases, which might be 
invoked when consciously negotiating 
with partners from a known, foreign cul-
ture. 
Since 1996, more than 4000 negotia-
tions have been carried out via Inspire. Most 
negotiators are students who participate in the 
negotiations as part of their courses held at 
various universities worldwide. This ongoing 
exercise helped to create a unique database of 
negotiation records, which can be used to 
study the impact of culture on negotiations at a 
larger scale than was previously possible. 
However, because the user community of a 
system like Inspire can not be controlled to the 
same extent as in laboratory experiments, the 
study presented here must be considered as an 
exploratory ex post analysis of the existing 
data rather than the outcome of a controlled 
experiment. 
The results of our analysis not only 
confirm that culture influences negotiation 
through its effects on communication 
(Elgstrom 1990), but it also suggests that these 
influences are broad in scope. This study also 
confirms the finding that while electronic 
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communication decreases the communication 
richness, it is in fact a much richer medium 
than earlier believed (Lee 1994) and capable of 
promoting positive relational communication 
among people (Walther 1995). This research 
confirms that Web-based negotiations with 
anonymous partners do not neutralize individ-
ual differences or cultural influences and al-
lows the “Netizens” to maintain their cultural 
roots. 
In the next section, we discuss the con-
cept and measurement of culture as well as 
earlier studies on its influence on inter-cultural 
negotiations. In this section we also present the 
framework underlying our research. The nego-
tiations conducted via the Inspire system are 
described in the third section and the data as 
well as the analysis are provided in the fourth 
section, followed by conclusions and sugges-
tions for further research. 
CULTURE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Culture being one of the negotiators’ 
characteristics may have direct impact on the 
negotiation processes. It may also influence 
the negotiators’ perceptions, expectations and 
behavior thus having indirect effects on the 
processes and their outcomes. We discuss here 
the framework of analysis and its constructs 
which are used in this study. 
Framework of analysis 
Negotiations can be studied at the level 
of individual negotiators and at the group level 
where the interactions between the negotiators 
take place. In this study, we consider bilateral 
negotiations, with a group comprising two 
negotiators. Because culture is, by definition, a 
property of each individual negotiator, the 
focus of this study is on the individual level. 
However, not all dimensions of negotiations 
can be fully understood at the individual level, 
so our research framework depicted in Figure 
1 also takes the negotiator’s opponent into 
account. 
This framework combines several inter-
related constructs discussed in the negotiation 
literature (Sayer and Guetzkow 1965; Rubin 
and Brown 1975; Adler and Graham 1989). As 
a main exogenous factor, we consider ‘nego-
tiator characteristics’ including culture. While 
negotiation processes and outcomes can also 
depend on other factors, such as the nature of 
the problem and the context in which the nego-
tiations are performed, these factors are identi-
cal for all negotiations analyzed here and thus 
are not explicitly shown in our framework.  
Negotiators’ characteristics influence 
expectations, which are formed prior to enter-
ing the negotiation process (Tung 1988; Chan 
1998). Based on these expectations and other 
characteristics, the negotiator selects a pattern 
of behavior during the process (White and 
Neale 1994), which in turn leads to a certain 
outcome for the negotiator. Evidently, the out-
come of a negotiation does not depend solely 
on the actions of one party, but is jointly de-
termined by the actions of both parties. Also, 
the negotiation process itself can be defined as 
a pattern of interactions, consisting of commu-
nication acts and responses and reinforce-
ments. Thus, the negotiation process is clearly 














Figure 1. Framework of Analysis 
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planned reactions to (anticipated) behavior of 
the opponent are also part of a strategy, which 
is selected before the actual negotiations. As 
the focus of this study is on individuals rather 
than on negotiation dyads we consider behav-
ior as an individual variable, which is only 
partly influenced by opponent characteristics. 
 
In this study, we are mainly concerned 
with direct and indirect effects of culture on 
the other constructs (see Figure 1 and Appen-
dix 1 for concepts and variables). Culture is 
thus the main negotiator characteristic studied 
here. The second important characteristic of 
negotiators is their negotiation strategy. In the 
literature on negotiations, the concept of ‘at-
mosphere’ is often used to describe the per-
sonal attitudes of the negotiators during the 
process. Chan, Graham and others suggest two 
main factors that contribute to the atmosphere 
and process: negotiation strategy and attrac-
tiveness (Graham and Mintu-Wimsatt 1997; 
Calantone, Graham and Mintu-Wimsattt 1998; 
Chan 1998). Since attractiveness refers to the 
personal relationship of negotiators, we do not 
consider it to be central in the context of 
anonymous, Web-based negotiations and 
therefore do not consider it in our empirical 
analysis. 
Negotiation strategy can be described 
using the dual concern model, which considers 
both the negotiators’ concern for their own 
outcome and their concern for the other party's 
outcome (Thomas and Killman 1974). By 
combining these two dimensions, four strate-
gies can be identified. In the contending strat-
egy, negotiators are concerned mainly with 
their own outcomes and less with those of the 
other party. Such negotiators tend to have high 
aspiration levels and make few concessions. 
The process is competitive, leading to "win-
lose" agreements (Chan 1998).  
Negotiators who have high concern for 
both their own and the other party’s outcomes 
follow the problem solving strategy. They per-
ceive the other party's outcome as instrumental 
for the achievement of their own outcomes and 
consider the negotiation as a way of solving a 
common problem to the satisfaction of both 
sides. Yielding and inactive strategies incorpo-
rate low concern for one’s own outcomes. Ac-
tors pursuing inactive strategies would not 
enter into negotiations at all and actors apply-
ing a yielding strategy are prepared to meet the 
needs of their negotiation partners without 
considering their own needs. Hence, we con-
sider these strategies to be less relevant in the 
context of this study, although we may also 
observe to some extent yielding and inactive 
behavior. Inactive behavior can be associated 
with the cases in which the negotiation dead-
line, which is usually set to three weeks, ex-
pired without a formal termination of the nego-
tiation. This occurred in less than 3% of all 
negotiations analyzed here. 
Apart from culture and strategy, we 
control for the subjects’ gender and the role 
they play in the negotiation case. Other charac-
teristics such as previous negotiations experi-
ence are not explicitly taken into account. This 
limitation is not made because we consider 
other factors to be of no influence, but because 
we intend to highlight the influences that are at 
the focus of our interest. Since most users of 
Inspire come from a rather homogenous popu-
lation of business and information systems 
students, the potential impact of other factors, 
such as age and professional background, is 
rather limited.  
Process characteristics involve the tim-
ing of offers, the amount of concessions made, 
arguments and their support, and other dy-
namic aspects. Since one important character-
istic of the negotiations considered here is the 
use of an Internet-based NSS as the sole com-
munication channel, system use and communi-
cation patterns are our main concern. In the 
Inspire system, users may communicate via 
specific, formalized offers, or via free-format 
text messages; as well as use a combination of 
both. 
Results and post-negotiation assess-
ments are task-related and satisfaction-related 
outcomes (Pinsonneault and Kraemer 1989; 
Gray, Vogel and Beauclair 1990). The former 
are objective outcomes defining the compro-
mise achieved and the associated utility levels. 
The satisfaction-related assessment is a subjec-
tive evaluation of the negotiation, the results, 
and the negotiator’s and the counterpart’s per-
formance. In the present study, we focus on 
task-related outcomes. Satisfaction is an im-
portant concept especially in the context of 
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evaluating the negotiation support system and 
its capabilities. But an analysis of satisfaction 
would also have to take into account system 
characteristics and the specific use of various 
features of the system and thus is beyond the 
scope of the present study. 
In the Inspire negotiations, contextual 
factors like specifics of the negotiation prob-
lem, organization(s) within which the negotia-
tion is conducted, and means and technologies 
of communication are kept constant. All sub-
jects deal with the same problem, which is 
administered to them in the same way. Nego-
tiators are not informed as to whether they are 
bargaining with someone from their own coun-
try or from a different country, but they can 
provide this information during the process. Ex 
ante, the difference between inter- and cross-
cultural negotiations is not noticeable to them, 
nevertheless, we control for this factor in our 
analyses.  
The concept of culture 
Culture can be defined as the collective 
programming of the mind, which builds on 
shared norms and values (Hofstede 1980, 
p.21). Culture is a mechanism of collective 
sense making; it binds individuals in groups 
and distinguishes one group of people from 
another. In this study, we are especially con-
cerned with cultural differences between na-
tions (countries), although we control other 
factors such as gender that exhibit significant 
variation within our group of subjects.  
The study of cultural differences in 
Web-based negotiations has to integrate sev-
eral concepts. Besides the concept of culture 
itself, we have to consider the impact of tech-
nology, i.e. the negotiation support system, 
which imposes restrictions on the behavior of 
subjects and at the same time enables and sup-
ports specific behavior. Walther (Walther 
1997) goes further and argues—using his find-
ings on computer-mediated communication—
that "Computer mediated communication is an 
amplifier or magnifier of social psychological 
and communication phenomena ..." (p. 360). 
The impacts of technology on cultural 
behavior have been studied in research on 
group decision support systems (GDSSs) and, 
as GDSSs are now called, in group support 
systems (GSSs). These studies led to interest-
ing, although conflicting results. A recent sur-
vey (Tung and Quaddus 2002) compares 30 
studies dealing with the relationship between 
culture and results obtained with the use of 
GSSs. In 16 studies that involved laboratory 
experiments, field and action research, empiri-
cal analyses were conducted using culture as 
an independent variable. Twelve of these stud-
ies (75%) reported differences in the process 
or results of GSS supported tasks between 
subjects from different cultures (Tung and 
Quaddus 2002, p. 180ff). 
Some of the studies suggest that sup-
port systems allow to “better accommodate 
diversity” (Cukier and Middleton 1996, p 296) 
than face-to-face communication settings. At-
kinson and Pervan (1998) state that anonymity 
leads to higher productivity in all cultures they 
studied. Another study also confirms this find-
ing but additionally indicates that the produc-
tivity gain is higher for high power distance 
cultures (Tung and Quaddus 2002, p. 182). 
Daily and Teich (2001) report that multiethnic 
group members who use GSS make more 
evenly spread contributions than similarly 
composed unsupported groups. Chidambaram 
and Kautz (1993) note that the anonymity of 
electronic message systems, electronic re-
cording and display capabilities, facilitate 
communication of diverse groups and lead to 
better outcomes. These studies indicate that the 
influence of culture on behavior in computer-
mediated communication is partly reduced and 
partly amplified. This may be due to different 
dimensions along which cultures can be dis-
tinguished. In the following section, we dis-
cuss different dimensions of culture and their 
possible influence on computer-mediated ne-
gotiations. 
The most popular classification scheme 
based on four dimensions of culture was de-
veloped by Hofstede (1980); other dimensions 
were proposed by Adler (1993a), Hall (1976), 
and O'Hara-Devereaux and Johansen (1994). 
An overview of cultural dimensions which 
should be taken into account in a cultural 
analysis is given in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Dimensions of culture  
Hofstede Adler Hall O'Hara-Devereaux & 
Johansen 
Individualism –  
collectivism 
Relationship to other 
people 
  
Power distance   Equality-power 
Uncertainty avoidance    
Masculinity –  
femininity 
Activity   
 Nature of people   
 Relationship to nature   
 Space Space  
  Context Context 
 Temporal  
orientation 
Time Time 
   Language 
   Information flows 
 
The individualism/collectivism dimen-
sion distinguishes whether the common values 
and beliefs of the community emphasize the 
needs of an individual or the needs of the 
group. Previous research has shown a signifi-
cant impact of this dimension on problem solv-
ing approach and atmosphere during face-to-
face negotiations (Chan, Triandis, Carnevale et 
al. 1994; Graham, Mintu and Rogers 1994; 
Lituchy 1997). Even though, in anonymous 
negotiations, the negotiators initially do not 
know whether they bargain with an in-group or 
out-group partner we expect that individualis-
tic vs. collectivistic values of negotiators also 
have an impact in computer-mediated negotia-
tions. 
Power distance measures the percep-
tion of, and attitude towards, authority and 
power. Previous research in face-to-face com-
munication suggests that status as well as role 
(e.g. buyer or seller) of the negotiators influ-
ence negotiations in some cultures (Graham, 
Mintu and Rogers 1994; Graham and Mintu-
Wimsatt 1997). Studies by Brett, Adair et al. 
(1998) support the assumption that social 
status and roles are more important in high 
power distance cultures than in low power 
distance cultures. However, others state that 
the removal of social context cues in com-
puter-mediated communication has a "substan-
tial deregulating effect" (Sproull and Kiesler 
1986; Sproull and Kiesler 1991 p. 1492). This 
is supported by Tan, Wei et al. (Tan, Wei, 
Watson et al. 1998), who report that computer-
mediated communication reduced status ef-
fects in two cultures. We therefore expect only 
a weak impact of power distance in electronic 
negotiations, as cues of social status are to a 
great extent not visible and status differences 
are not easily observable in this context. How-
ever, the role of the negotiator (i.e., buyer or 
seller), which is obvious to the parties, can 
influence negotiation behavior in our experi-
ments. 
The uncertainty avoidance dimension 
captures the way members of a culture handle 
risk and uncertainty. Generally, attitudes to-
wards risk and uncertainty are an important 
dimension for the analysis of negotiation proc-
esses. Although we have no reason to believe 
that the use of a NSS dampens the influence of 
this dimension on the behavior of negotiators, 
we do not expect a high impact of this dimen-
sion in our analysis. In the problem used for 
the experiments, the outcomes of all alterna-
tives were known with certainty to both part-
ners, thus individual (or culturally determined) 
risk attitudes should have no impact. 
The masculinity/femininity dimension 
reflects the degree to which either masculine 
norms such as achievement and material 
orientation or feminine norms like 
relationship, people orientation and quality of 
life are important in a culture (Hofstede 1980, 
p. 205). Alternative labels to this dimension 
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Alternative labels to this dimension are 
‘achievement’ for high masculinity versus 
‘nurturance’ for low masculinity cultures 
(Chesebro 1998), and the ‘activity dimension’ 
proposed by Adler (1993a), which captures the 
attitude of cultures towards work activities. 
Although Graham, Mintu et al. (1994) did not 
find a significant impact of this dimension on 
behavior in face-to-face negotiations and out-
comes, we assume that it is an important vari-
able for two reasons. Firstly, we believe that 
this dimension plays a role in formulating ex-
pectations of negotiators prior to negotiations. 
Secondly, masculine norms are related to a 
high task orientation and competitiveness 
whereas feminine values are related to an ori-
entation towards social relationships. When 
using an NSS, this effect could be amplified, 
as the system facilitates task orientation (Ker-
sten and Noronha 1999a). 
In addition to the dimensions already 
discussed, Adler's (1993a p. 32) dimensions 
also encompass the nature of people, i.e. be-
liefs about other people, whether they are good 
or evil, and assumptions whether people can 
change their behavior and attitudes. The im-
pact of this dimension on negotiation behavior 
should not be reduced by the implementation 
of a NSS.  
The dimension relationship to nature is 
related to the basic assumptions of cultures 
whether humans can control nature or have to 
adapt to nature. Concerning this dimension we 
do not expect an important influence on the 
behavior of negotiators, given the specific con-
text of the case in our analysis.  
Another dimension of Adler's classifi-
cation is the orientation of a culture towards 
space, i.e. the extent to which individuals op-
erate in a private or public manner. The system 
used for this analysis provided a private space 
for each negotiation and we therefore ignore 
this dimension in our analysis. 
The context dimension distinguishes be-
tween high and low context cultures based on 
the importance of contextual factors in com-
munication processes (Hall 1976). The content 
of a message can only be fully understood in 
the context of its transmission, i.e. nonverbal 
aspects of communication, physical environ-
ment, social status and power relationships, 
roles etc. In high context cultures, information 
is either contained in the physical context or 
internalized in the person and therefore an ex-
plicit coding is often not necessary, whereas in 
low context cultures messages are transmitted 
explicitly and directly (Ting-Toomey and Gao 
1991).  
In face-to-face negotiations, the context 
dimension proved to have an important impact 
on the behavior of negotiators. In Graham’s 
research (1985), the Japanese, having a high-
context culture, shared less information di-
rectly (e.g., answers to questions and direct 
negative reactions) than other negotiators. 
Brett (1998) found that Japanese shared infor-
mation through the use of a relatively large 
number of offers and counteroffers. In anony-
mous electronic communication, the social and 
physical context is strongly reduced. Here, 
context can only be established by transmitting 
additional information that goes beyond mere 
offers. This special context should, therefore, 
lead to different communication behavior of 
people from high context cultures and low 
context cultures. We therefore expect to ob-
serve such differences in computer-mediated 
negotiations. 
The time dimension describes the orien-
tation towards time and it is linked to the con-
text dimension. High-context cultures tend to 
be polychronic, which means that people are 
involved in many different activities with dif-
ferent people at the same time (Hall 1976, p. 
150). Additionally, a rather circular time per-
spective stresses high involvement (which 
produces a greater degree of context) and 
completion of transactions rather than adher-
ence to a predetermined schedule. People in 
monochronic cultures, on the other hand, have 
a linear time perspective, they prefer to under-
take one activity at a time and emphasize pri-
ority setting, schedules, segmentation, and 
promptness. Although the time perspective is 
an important dimension in inter-cultural nego-
tiations (Mayfield, Mayfield, Martin et al. 
1997), we expect that in the given experimen-
tal setting (predetermined schedule of negotia-
tions), this dimension has less influence on the 
behavior of the subjects. 
The language dimension of O'Hara-
Devereaux and Johansen (1994) measures tol-
erance and acceptance of individuals towards 
(lingual) minorities within a culture (Cukier 
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and Middleton 1996). Generally, language and 
therefore communication and thinking patterns 
are highly interrelated with culture (Kaplan 
1966). Consequently, language is certainly an 
important dimension to study in computer-
mediated negotiations. Kaplan (1966) shows 
that even if persons communicate in a foreign 
language, communication and thought patterns 
of the maternal language (and culture) are evi-
dent. Thus, this dimension should influence 
negotiators' behavior. 
The dimension information flow distin-
guishes whether members of a culture prefer 
objective information for decision making and 
problem solving processes or rather rely on 
informal networks as information sources 
(Cukier and Middleton 1996 p. 299). NSSs and 
GSSs are developed to make decision and ne-
gotiation processes more transparent and ob-
jective. Empirical research delivers conflicting 
evidence concerning this issue. Sarbaugh-
Thompson and Feldman (1998) found higher 
task orientation in computer-mediated group 
processes while Walther (1995) did not ob-
serve a difference in task orientation between 
face-to-face groups and groups in a GSS envi-
ronment. Despite these inconclusive results, 
we assume that negotiators with a cultural 
norm of fact-based and objective decision 
making are assisted better by a NSS than nego-
tiators of cultures who usually base their deci-
sions on informal sources. We expect a NSS to 
serve as an amplifier of these cultural aspects. 
We also expect the cultural variations to be 
clearly visible in NSS-supported negotiations.  
In summary, this analysis leads us to a 
focus on cultural dimensions concerning com-
munication aspects. Currently, we do not 
know much about interaction effects between 
technology and culture and its impact on nego-
tiation processes. Only a few of our sugges-
tions are already empirically supported, hence 
the majority of them must be considered as 
tentative propositions. Given the data we have 
from our experiments, we cannot test hypothe-
ses using computer-supported vs. face-to-face 
groups. But the data available represents a 
wide spectrum of users from different cultures 
in a computer-based setting. Hence, in this 
exploratory analysis of computer-mediated 
negotiations, we will focus our attention on 
those dimensions where cultural differences 
should be visible from communicational pat-
terns and information flow. Additionally, as 
previously shown, individualism, collectivism, 
masculinity and femininity norms and the re-
lated concepts of achievement orientation 
should play an important role in the develop-
ment of expectations as well as in the problem 
solving approach. 
RESEARCH SETTING 
The experiments which we describe 
here were carried out using the Inspire system. 
The system is available on the Internet and 
used as a teaching tool at a number of universi-
ties around the world. This creates a rather 
open environment as compared to traditional 
laboratory experiments. Nevertheless, by keep-
ing many negotiation parameters constant, 
some control can be exercised over the ex-
periments. 
Negotiation case 
In all experiments carried out, a single 
case based on a simulated buyer-seller busi-
ness negotiation for one commodity was used. 
The negotiations “Itex-Cypress” are conducted 
between representatives of two companies: 
Itex Manufacturing, a producer of bicycle 
components, and Cypress Cycles, a builder of 
bicycles. As the users’ English proficiency 
might be low, the case is fairly simple and well 
structured. The case description fits one and a 
half pages. In order to verify the case and the 
language difficulty, the case was tested with 
two groups of students (65 in total) taking their 
first university-level ESL (English as a second 
language) course.  
In writing the case an effort was made 
to make it ‘culture neutral’ as much as possi-
ble: the subject of the negotiation (bicycle) is 
known in every country.1 While it is probably 
impossible to invent names which are equally 
unrelated to any language in the world, the 
names used in the case are rather neutral with 
respect to culture and all users are aware that 
these names bear no relationship whatsoever to 
their opponent’s country of origin.  
Both parties are presented with their 
side of the case; they are told that they are to 
                                                          
1 The Itex-Cypress case was written by Dr. 
David Cray, School of Business, Carleton 
University. 
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represent Itex (or Cypress) and that their com-
panies are interested in achieving a compro-
mise. They are also informed that there are 
other suppliers and buyers; a participant may 
terminate one negotiation and a request new 
one. Hence a breakdown in negotiations is 
possible.  
There are four issues that both sides 
have to discuss: the price of components, de-
livery times, payment arrangements and terms 
for the return of defective parts. For each issue 
there is a given set of options, i.e., issue val-
ues. Altogether, there are 180 complete and 
different potential offers (alternatives) that 
contain all four issues.  
The participants are not given issue pri-
orities. Thus they have to decide if, for exam-
ple, the price is more important than the deliv-
ery time. They also have to determine the spe-
cific trade-off values between issues. Each 
side, however, is given a clear indication as to 
the desirability of the options (issue values) in 
terms of the direction. There are several rea-
sons for requesting that the participants specify 
their own preferences, rather than use standard 
ratings set by the experimenters. Firstly, there 
are convincing arguments that preference 
structures can depend on culture. Hofstede’s 
study, for example, gives reason to expect cul-
tural dependence of utility functions that re-
flect differences in the risk attitude (1997). In 
the simulation, the participants’ partial utilities 
(part-worths) regarding each issue can be lin-
ear as well as non-linear (convex or concave) 
and thus represent different risk attitudes 
(Keeney and Raiffa 1976; Schoemaker 1982). 
An imposition of preferences could introduce 
the experimenters’ cultural bias. Finally, by 
allowing participants to establish their own 
priorities within each issue, we expect them to 
be more involved in the role-playing, and to 
pursue their own negotiation style. 
The Inspire negotiation support system  
Inspire has its roots in negotiation 
analysis (Sebenius 1992) and such negotiation 
support systems as Nego (Kersten 1985) and 
Negotiation Assistant (Rangaswamy and Shell 
1997). One research goal in its development 
was to study the use of decision analysis in the 
practice of negotiations. A major innovation of 
the Inspire system is to offer users both a 
communication platform to conduct negotia-
tions as well as analytical and visual tools to 
assist users in the negotiation process.  
Via the communication platform, nego-
tiators exchange offers consisting of values for 
all four issues (price, delivery, payment, return 
of defective parts). Additionally, they can also 
attach text messages to offers or exchange 
messages without offers. This opportunity for 
enriched communication not only makes the 
negotiation process more realistic but also al-
lows to provide contextual information (Ker-
sten and Noronha 1999a). By exchanging in-
formation about attitudes and expectations, 
negotiators can create a positive negotiation 
atmosphere more easily and develop a per-
sonal relationship based on mutual understand-
ing and trust. They can also exert pressure on 
the negotiation partners.  
In addition to the communication plat-
form, Inspire contains analytical features to 
support users in their decision making in each 
of the three phases of negotiations: pre-
negotiation, negotiation, and post-settlement 
(Kersten and Noronha 1999b).  
In the pre-negotiation phase, the system 
is used to analyze the scenario and evaluate 
feasible alternatives (possible offers). In this 
phase, each user specifies his/her preferences 
and the system constructs the user's utility 
function. The system uses hybrid conjoint 
measurement for utility construction and dis-
crete optimization (Green and Wind 1973; 
Angur, Lotfi and Sarkis 1996). Conjoint analy-
sis is simple, does not impose major require-
ments on the users, and does not require linear-
ity assumptions.  
During the negotiation phase, the sys-
tem provides personal utility values of deci-
sion alternatives considered by the user and of 
the offers submitted by both parties. The sys-
tem records the process and provides a nego-
tiation history as well as a graphical represen-
tation of the negotiation dynamics. The Inspire 
system presents this information to both par-
ties in a symmetric manner. Each party can see 
only those ratings which are based on their 
own preferences (utilities), and the color-
coding is uniform: green for the supported user 
(offers sent) and red for the opponent (offers 
received). This visualization of the negotiation 
dynamics provides a rich representation of the 
process (see Figure 2), but does not guide the 
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user towards a specific behavior during the 
negotiation (Silver 1990). 
After the parties agree upon a compro-
mise, the system determines whether the 
achieved compromise is non-dominated (effi-
cient). If it is inefficient, the system suggests 
the post-settlement phase. This phase begins 
with the computation of efficient alternatives 
which dominate the achieved compromise. 
Several alternatives are selected and displayed. 
The parties may then continue their negotia-
tion until they reach an efficient compromise.  
Figure 3 explains the relationship be-
tween the support features of Inspire and the 
main objective of our research: the role of cul-
ture on the behavior of the negotiators who use 
a NSS. The support features available in In-
spire can be seen as limitations that restrict the 
negotiators’ scope of activities and the use of 
various forms of communication. They can 
also be considered in terms of facilitation in 
that they allow using a variety of tools that can 
help and support the negotiators. 
Procedure 
Most of the subjects of this study are 
graduate or MBA students who use the system 
as a part of their course assignments. The 
courses range from information systems, deci-
sion support systems, negotiations, law, inter-
national business, to English as a second lan-
guage, and tourism. Examples of students’ 
assignments are available at: 
http://interneg.carleton.ca/interneg/training/ins
pire. 
Inspire negotiations are set up once 
every 2-3 months for groups of students from 
several universities; there are typically be-
tween 100 and 200 students from 3-5 universi-
ties who negotiate at the same time. Students 
log-in to the system by providing the negotia-
tion name and the user name. Every negotiator 
knows only his/her counterpart’s user name. 
Although users are not prevented from reveal-
ing their identity or other personal information, 
they cannot verify the information provided by 
their counterparts because of the geographical 
distance involved. During the negotiation, the 
parties are in contact only with each other, the 
experimenters have no contact with the users.  
Negotiations are conducted over three 
weeks with an imposed deadline. Upon request 
from both negotiators, the deadline may be 
extended. At any point in time each of the two 
negotiators may terminate the negotiation.  
 
 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the negotiation history 
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Figure 3. The impact of culture on NSS-supported negotiation behavior 
Inspire users do not receive any incen-
tives from the experimenters. Those who con-
duct negotiation as a part of their course work 
are motivated by assignment requirements. 
However, their choice of strategy and willing-
ness to achieve a compromise cannot be veri-
fied by their instructors because: (1) the nego-
tiation results also depend on the opponent, 
and (2) instructors do not receive any informa-
tion regarding their students’ activities. 
There is one exception in the experi-
menters’ lack of control of the Inspire negotia-
tions. If one negotiator complains that her/his 
counterpart does not participate in the negotia-
tion, then such a counterpart receives an e-mail 
from the system administrator. She/he is given 
three days to engage in negotiations. If the 
counterpart remains inactive, the negotiation is 
terminated and the negotiator is given an op-
tion of entering a new negotiation with another 
counterpart. In each series of negotiations 
there is less than 5% of the inactive partners. 
Another possible influence on the users’ ac-
tivities is the negotiation deadline imposed by 
the Inspire system, and also the instructor’s 
deadline for submitting an assignment which is 
beyond the control of the experimenters. How-
ever, all instructors accept that the negotiation 
may take at least three weeks. 
RESULTS 
The results presented here are based on 
data from negotiations carried out between 
1996 and 2000. Although the negotiations 
covered a period of five years, the entire setup 
remained unchanged throughout this time, so 
all data points are comparable. However, be-
cause of the openness of the system, these 
analyses must be considered as explorative 
rather than the outcome of strictly controlled 
experiments. 
Data and user characteristics 
Results reported in this paper are based 
on data collected from 1102 negotiations be-
tween 2204 users from 55 countries. Inspire 
provides a considerable amount of information 
from automatically generated process logs, and 
from questionnaires which the users fill in at 
the beginning and the end of their negotiations.  
As outlined above, we use the national 
culture as an independent variable. In most of 
the previous studies, the country in which the 
experiments were conducted is used as an in-
dicator of the national culture of subjects, e.g. 
(Druckman, Benton, Ali et al. 1976; Adler and 
Graham 1989; Herbig and Kramer 1991; 
Rubin and Sander 1991; Adler 1993b; Graham 
and Mintu-Wimsatt 1997). This assumption 
may fog the results—particularly for countries 
with large populations of recent immigrants 
and foreign students.  
With university education becoming in-
creasingly international the current country of 
residence can be a misleading indicator of a 
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user's national culture. Therefore, we restricted 
our sample to users for whom both the country 
of birth and the country of residence was the 
same. This country was then used as an indica-
tor of the national culture. Although this selec-
tion procedure does not take cultural diversity 
within one country into account, as is the case 
for example in Canada and the USA, we can 
control at least for migration to some extent 
(Kersten and Noronha 1999a). Additionally, to 
obtain sufficient cell populations in the analy-
ses of variance that were performed, only 
countries with at least 60 users were consid-
ered.  
In total, 1366 data records of individual 
negotiators fulfilled these two conditions and 
were used in our analysis. The sample of the 
Inspire users that is used in this study is given 
in Table 2.  
Single-equation General Linear Models 
(GLMs) were estimated for metric dependent 
variables. For dependent variables measured 
on an ordinal scale, logistic regression models 
were estimated. In reporting the results of 
these estimations, effects significant at the 1% 
confidence level are printed in boldface, re-
sults significant at the 5% level in italics. The 
variables used to operationalize the concepts 
of our research framework and their descrip-
tive statistics are given in the Appendix 1.  
In addition to the country of residence 
and gender, we also considered the problem 
solving attitude (PSA) as a characteristic of 
negotiators. Following Calantone, Graham et 
al. (1998) we used factor analysis to derive a 
PSA index from five Likert-scale variables 
measuring the cooperation, exploitation, hon-
esty, informativeness and persuasiveness of the 
opponent, which were obtained from the post-
negotiation questionnaire. The factor loadings 
obtained for the first two principal factors are 
given in Table 3.  
The first factor can clearly be inter-
preted as a problem solving strategy. The load-
ing associated with variable “exploitative” has 
the opposite sign from the other variables be-
cause exploitativeness describes a negative 
attitude. Persuasiveness may be interpreted in 
both directions. It is positively correlated with 
the other characteristics, indicating perhaps 
Table 2. Composition of sample 
Gender Country of opponent Country  
Female (%) Male (%) Undeclared (%) Other (%) Same (%) 
Total 
Austria (AT)  21 (35) 39 (65) --  37 (62)  23 (38)  60 
Canada (CA) 107 (33) 139 (43) 75 (24) 120 (37) 201 (63)  321 
Germany (DE) 61 (51) 58 (48)  1 (1) 101 (84)  19 (16)  120 
Ecuador (EC) 74 (53) 64 (46)  1 (1) 92 (66)  47 (34)  139 
Finland (FI) 39 (33) 64 (53)  17 (14) 66 (55)  54 (45)  120 
Hong Kong (HK) 22 (32) 8 (12)  39 (56)  53 (77)  16 (23)  69 
India (IN) 19 (10) 138 (77)  23 (13) 99 (55)  81 (45)  180 
Russia (RU) 48 (52) 43 (46)  2 (2) 35 (38)  58 (62)  93 
Taiwan (TW) 26 (43) 33 (55)  1 (2) 46 (77)  14 (23)  60 
USA (US) 71 (35) 122 (60)  11 (5) 132 (65)  72 (35)  204 
Total: N (%) 488 (38) 708 (52)  170 (12) 781 (57) 585 (43)  1366 
 
Table 3. Factor loadings for problem solving and contending strategies 
Opponent perceived as... Factor 1 Factor 2
Cooperative     0.81456   -0.23033
Exploitative    -0.28687    0.86231
Honest     0.81156   -0.07342
Informative     0.75417    0.21743
Persuasive     0.60610    0.54545
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that an opponent with positive characteristics 
is also more persuasive than the one with 
negative characteristics.  
Interpretation of the second factor is 
more difficult. Given the orthogonal property 
of factor analysis, it encompasses effects not 
explained by the first factor. Factor loadings 
for this factor are particularly high for the 
question describing exploitativeness. An op-
ponent with a high score on the second factor 
is thus pursuing a contending strategy, show-
ing low concern for the partner’s outcome.  
In contrast to the other variables de-
scribing a negotiator, problem solving attitude 
is not derived from self reported intentions in 
post negotiation questionnaires as in the ex-
periments by Graham, Mintu et al. (1994; 
1997), but from the perceptions of the coun-
terpart after the negotiation. Although this 
form of measurement could also introduce 
biases, we believe that the assessment of PSA 
of the opponent based on experiences is at 
least to some extent more reliable than self 
reported PSA strategy.  
We use PSA as an independent variable 
for process and outcome analysis. However, 
we also investigated if our measure of PSA 
was significantly different for the 10 countries 
included in our study or if it was influenced by 
other factors.  
When considering the entire negotiation 
dyad, two PSA levels have to be distinguished 
for the two negotiation partners. In the follow-
ing tables, we denote the PSA level of a nego-
tiator by OwnPSA and that of his/her opponent 
by OppPSA. 
Table 4 shows the results of the GLM 
estimations of variables2 influencing PSA val-
ues. Disclosure of the negotiator’s identity 
(OwnDiscl) had a significant effect on the per-
ceived attitude at a confidence level of about 
1%. Negotiators who disclosed their identity 
were perceived as having an attitude more ori-
ented towards problem solving than those who 
did not disclose. As was expected, a higher 
score also caused the opponent to perceive the 
negotiator to have a higher PSA. The overall 
                                                          
2 Description of variables can be found in Ap-
pendix 1. 
fit of this model is rather low (R2=0.0744). 
Since our measure of PSA is based on subjec-
tive evaluation given by the opponent, many 
other personal factors beyond those measured 
here might have influenced the relationship 
between negotiators and thus entered these 
evaluations. 
Table 4. Variables influencing perceived 
PSA 
 Source DF F Value Pr>F 
OwnPSA CReside 9 0.78 0.6373 
R2=0.0744 NegoCase 1 0.09 0.7634 
 Gender 2 1.26 0.2838 
 HighExp 1 0.26 0.6091 
 InCtry 1 0.10 0.7483 
 OwnDiscl 1 5.92 0.0152 
 OppScore1 1 6.46 0.0112 
 OppGender 2 2.80 0.0616 
 OppHigh 1 0.29 0.5898 
 OppRes 9 1.24 0.2653 
1 OppScore, OppGender, etc. describe the oppo-
nent’s score, gender, expectation and residency 
Further analysis of the parameter values 
indicates weak influence of the opponent’s 
(but not the negotiator’s) characteristics on the 
perceived PSA. Female users perceived their 
partners to have a higher PSA than male users 
(βF - βM = 0.17968, t=2.28, p=0.0232). Al-
though the overall parameter for culture (coun-
try of residence) is not significant for neither 
the negotiator nor the opponent, there are some 
weakly significant effects for individual coun-
tries. Users from Austria perceived their nego-
tiation partners to have a lower PSA (β=-
0.36370, t=-2.22, p=0.0268), users from Rus-
sia assigned a higher PSA (β=0.38027, t=2.26, 
p=0.0241). Similar findings were reported by 
Calantone, Graham et al. (1998), who meas-
ured PSA in both ways, self reported and per-
ceived by opponent. Hence, our results suggest 
that the negotiators’ characteristics (including 
culture) appear to be unrelated to PSA which 
contradicts previous findings (Graham, Mintu 
and Rogers 1994).  
Expectations 
We use three variables to measure ex-
pectations: utility of the expected compromise 
(EScore), utility of the worst acceptable com-
promise (RScore), and expected friendliness of 
the negotiation (EFrndly). The first two vari-
ables are computed using the participant’s di-
rect and indirect input. In the pre-negotiation 
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questionnaire each participant formulated the 
expected compromise and the reservation lev-
els in terms of issues and their values. After 
filling in the questionnaire, the negotiators 
were requested to specify their preferences, 
and their utility function was then constructed. 
This made it possible to calculate the utility 
values of the expected and the worst compro-
mise. Expected friendliness was obtained from 
the pre-negotiation questionnaire. 
To test for possible influences of cul-
ture on expectations, we estimated GLM equa-
tions for the three dependent variables. The 
results of these estimations are given in Table 
5. 
Table 5. GLM models: expectations 
Dependent 
Variable 
Source DF F Value Pr > F 
EScore CReside  9 9.75 <.0001
(R2=0.1035) NegoCase 1 12.47 0.0004
 Gender 2 0.21 0.8130
 OwnPSA 1 0.37 0.5432
RScore CReside 9 3.16 0.0009
 (R2=0.0519) NegoCase 1 7.80 0.0054
  Gender 2 3.87 0.0213
 OwnPSA  0.06 0.8103
EFrndly CReside 9 7.80 <.0001
 (R2=0.0919) NegoCase 1 2.66 0.1033
  Gender 2 4.35 0.0132
 OwnPSA  0.79 0.3734
Again, the R2 values are rather low for 
all three models. This indicates that a large 
fraction of variance in expectations is not ex-
plained by the variables which we analyzed. 
Since expectations are a highly subjective con-
struct, it is likely that other personal character-
istics could have a strong impact on expecta-
tions. However, our results indicate that be-
yond these individual factors, which cannot be 
controlled or taken into account when develop-
ing NSS, cultural factors consistently have a 
significant effect on all three expectation vari-
ables. 
To analyze the effects individually for 
each country, we tested the regression parame-
ter of each country’s dummy variable against 
the average of all parameter estimates. The 
results for the two expectation variables con-
cerning the final score are represented in Table 
6. 
Users from Ecuador had exceptionally 
high expectations with respect to outcomes, 
which, to a lesser extent, are also reflected in 
their reservation levels. Possible explanation 
of the strong impact of the user’s culture on 
expectations is the high value of masculinity of 
Ecuador in comparison to the other countries 
in our sample. A consistently negative impact 
is present for the users from Germany. But the 
impact of culture on expected scores and res-
ervation scores is not always parallel, as can be 
seen in the results for e.g. Russia and the USA. 
Expected scores and reservation scores 
are also influenced by the role of the negotia-
tor. Compared to sellers, buyers had higher 
expected scores (β=5.23243, t=3.53, 
p=0.0004) as well as higher reservation scores 
(β=4.97908, t=2.79, p=0.0054). Gender had a 
weakly significant effect on reservation scores. 
Compared to the baseline estimate for users 
who did not declare their gender, the reserva-
tion score of female users was higher by 
1.34101 points (t=0.43, p=0.6646) and of
Table 6. GLM parameter estimates: expected and reservation scores 
 EScore RScore 
 Parameter t Value Pr > |t| Parameter t Value Pr > |t| 
Austria -4.74597 -1.63 0.1042 -0.60358 -0.17 0.8625 
Canada -2.65383 -1.70 0.0898 1.63678 0.87 0.3859 
Germany -11.64617 -4.56 <.0001 -7.54955 -2.48 0.0135 
Ecuador 17.87107 7.94 <.0001 5.85667 2.18 0.0295 
Finland 0.46347 0.21 0.8356 6.14481 2.30 0.0215 
Hong Kong 0.34901 0.10 0.9196 1.80826 0.43 0.6652 
India 2.40952 1.19 0.2338 -3.35234 -1.30 0.1930 
Russia 2.18746 0.84 0.3996 -9.94937 -3.21 0.0014 
Taiwan -1.35238 -0.46 0.6442 3.25025 0.92 0.3590 
USA -2.88218 -1.60 0.1097 2.75806 1.28 0.1997 
Gregory E. Kersten, Sabine T. Koeszegi, and Rudolf Vetschera 
 16
male users by 6.02009 points (t=1.98, 
p=0.0481), which led to the significant overall 
effect indicated in Table 5. 
Expectations of buyers and sellers were 
markedly different between countries, as Table 
7 shows.  
However, in a GLM model, the interac-
tion term between country and role turned out 
to be not significant (F=1.12, p=0.3448). 
The parameter estimates for expected 
friendliness are shown in Table 8. Users from 
Ecuador and Russia expected significantly 
more friendly negotiations than the average. 
The expectations of users from Finland, Hong 
Kong and India were significantly more pes-
simistic with respect to the negotiation friend-
liness. In addition, compared to the reference 
group, male users (β=-0.22040, t=-2.37, 
p=0.0179) expected negotiations to be less 
friendly than female users (β=-0.07146, t=-
0.74, p=0.4601). 
Communication behavior 
In our analysis, we consider communi-
cation behavior as an individual construct that 
is a property of an individual negotiator. While 
one might argue that communication always 
involves two parties, our focus is on the use of 
communication as a way to conduct negotia-
tions and achieve the negotiator’s goals, more 
or less independently of the opponent’s char-
acteristics. This point of view was confirmed 
by estimating models including the opponent’s 
characteristics as independent variables, which 
led to similar results as the individual models 
presented here and did not improve the fit of 
the model significantly. 
The first aspect of communication we 
studied is the extent to which various forms of 
communication provided by Inspire were used. 
Inspire enables users to send structured offers, 
attach textual messages to such offers and to 
send textual messages independently of offers. 
The number of times each of these features 
was used is measured by the variables Ofr, 
OfrwMsg, and Msg, respectively. Table 9 
summarizes the results of GLM models in 
which the usage of these three forms of com-
munication is explained by individual 
characteristics of the user. 
Table 7. Expected scores for buyers and sellers 
Buyer EScore Seller EScore   
Country Mean    N Mean    N Diff. of means 
Austria 72.13  41 60.32 19 11.82 
Canada 73.00 181 65.94 140 7.06 
Germany 64.63 54 59.41 66 5.22 
Ecuador 89.92 52 88.26 87 1.66 
Finland 71.24 70 69.78 50 1.46 
Hong Kong 70.96 12 66.25 57 4.71 
India 73.26 77 71.24 102 2.02 
Russia 71.66  32 70.77 61 0.89 
Taiwan 63.33  9 72.98  51 -9.65 
USA 70.56 102 63.50 102 7.06 
Table 8. GLM Parameter estimations for expected friendliness 
Parameter t Value Pr > |t|
Austria 0.04013 0.35 0.7287
Canada -0.09654 -1.56 0.1195
Germany -0.06981 -0.69 0.4906
Ecuador 0.65754 7.37 <.0001
Finland -0.17931 -2.03 0.0431
Hong Kong -0.28961 -2.11 0.0348
India -0.17334 -2.16 0.0309
Russia 0.24581 2.39 0.0171
Taiwan -0.04863 -0.42 0.6753
USA -0.08623 -1.21 0.2272
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Culture had a consistent and significant 
influence on communication behavior. In Ta-
ble 10 individual parameter estimates for the 
three communication forms and for each coun-
try are given. 
There is a clear distinction between the 
task oriented communication as indicated by 
the number of offers on one hand and the 
number of text messages, which might also 
include information not directly related to the 
negotiation. Text messages were used signifi-
cantly above average by users from Asian cul-
tures. These are high context cultures, and it is 
plausible that users from these cultures used 
the free format text messages to create a richer 
context for the negotiations. Surprisingly, task-
oriented communication was used to a signifi-
cantly higher extent than on average by users 
from Ecuador and Finland, which represent 
two very different cultures according to 
Hofstede’s dimensions. There are two possible 
explanations for this puzzling result: either 
there are several different mechanisms by 
which culture influences communication 
behavior, or the five dimensions identified by 
Hofstede do not sufficiently describe culture to 
identify the hidden common traits between 
Finland and Ecuador. 
The second variable which showed a 
significant impact on the communication be-
havior was the problem solving attitude (as 
perceived by the opponent). Users with a 
higher PSA made fewer offers (β=-0.22517, 
t=-3.27, p=0.0011) and sent a smaller number 
of free format messages (β=-0.19262, t=-3.25, 
p=0.0012) than users with a low PSA. 
Table 9. GLM Models for communication variables 
 Source DF FValue Pr>F
Ofr CReside 9 5.64 <.0001
R2=0.0764 NegoCase 1 0.02 0.8999
 Gender 2 0.87 0.4198
 Highexp 1 0.04 0.8327
 OwnPSA 1 10.68 0.0011
OfrwMsg CReside 9 9.29 <.0001
R2= 0.1042 NegoCase 1 0.02 0.8844
 Gender 2 0.18 0.8384
 Highexp 1 0.02 0.8951
 OwnPSA 1 3.65 0.0564
Msg CReside 9 3.49 0.0003
R2=0.0490 NegoCase 1 4.60 0.0322
 Gender 2 0.43 0.6477
 Highexp 1 0.00 0.9824
 OwnPSA 1 10.58 0.0012
Table 10. Parameter estimates for communication process variables 
 Ofr OfrwMsg Msg 
 Parameter t Pr > |t| Parameter t Pr > |t| Parameter t Pr > |t| 
Austria -0.26714 -0.95 0.3443 -0.22152 -0.82 0.4117 -0.48286 -1.99 0.0469 
Canada -0.11665 -0.77 0.4393 -0.13415 -0.93 0.3520 -0.15214 -1.17 0.2408 
Germany -0.42884 -1.72 0.0855 -0.19201 -0.81 0.4201 -0.31656 -1.48 0.1397 
Ecuador 1.22017 5.47 <.0001 1.50115 7.05 <.0001 -0.04063 -0.21 0.8322 
Finland 0.68596 3.18 0.0015 0.55461 2.69 0.0072 -0.32779 -1.77 0.0772 
Hong Kong -0.32093 -0.96 0.3359 -0.12340 -0.39 0.6985 0.37495 1.31 0.1911 
India -0.47665 -2.44 0.0148 -0.50763 -2.72 0.0066 0.37489 2.24 0.0257 
Russia -0.24597 -0.98 0.3262 -1.07914 -4.51 <.0001 -0.20411 -0.95 0.3432 
Taiwan 0.21364 0.76 0.4498 0.40477 1.50 0.1342 0.98421 4.05 <.0001 
USA -0.26359 -1.52 0.1294 -0.20269 -1.22 0.2222 -0.20997 -1.41 0.1599 
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The post-negotiation questionnaire also 
provides some insight into the content of mes-
sages that were exchanged, specifically 
whether the negotiator disclosed his or her 
identity to the opponent. A logistic regression 
was used to analyze possible effects of indi-
vidual characteristics on the likelihood of dis-
closing one’s identity. The results of this 
analysis are represented in Table 11. 
Two factors had a highly significant in-
fluence on disclosing one’s identity: culture 
and problem solving attitude. Users perceived 
to have a high problem solving attitude are 
also more likely (Maximum likelihood β= 
0.3242, χ2=12.1395, p=0.0005) to disclose 
their identity. The influence of culture is de-
scribed by the parameter estimates shown in 
Table 12. 
Users from Germany and Russia dis-
closed their identity significantly more often 
than the average, while users from Canada, 
Finland and India were less likely to disclose 
their identity. Since users from rather different 
cultures exhibit similar behavior, and on the 
other hand different behavior is observed with 
similar cultures, we consider it likely that dis-
closure of identity was influenced by other 
variables than culture. One such variable could 
be the influence of users’ home institutions 
and local instructors, who probably empha-
sized the importance of anonymity in Inspire 
negotiations to a different degree. 
Negotiation results 
The results a negotiator achieves de-
pend on individual personality traits of the 
negotiator as well as on characteristics of the 
opponent. We therefore included the character-
istics of the opponent as explanatory variables 
in these models. Table 13 presents the results 
of the GLM estimation on the score (utility 
value) achieved by the negotiators. Compared 
to the other models, the overall fit of this 
model was considerably better. 
In addition to culture, several variables 
had a significant influence on the score which 
a negotiator was able to obtain. At the 1% 
level of significance, users’ expectations had a 
clear impact. As could be expected, high ex-
pectations also led to better performance 
(β=11.01302, t=6.83, p<.0001). 
Table 11. Influences on disclosing identity - Logistic regression 
Source DF Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
CReside 9 57.9312 <.0001 
NegoCase 1 2.8091 0.0937 
Gender 2 2.2457 0.3253 
HighExp 1 3.5145 0.0608 
OwnPSA 1 12.1395 0.0005 
 
Table 12. Parameter estimates for disclosing identity (logistic regression) 
 Parameter Wald Chi-Square DF Pr>ChiSq 
Austria -0.09123 0.0733 1 0.7865 
Canada -0.71831 11.5484 1 0.0007 
Germany 0.96861 13.4533 1 0.0002 
Ecuador -0.21580 0.5388 1 0.4629 
Finland -0.95021 8.0338 1 0.0046 
Hong Kong 0.47200 1.4965 1 0.2212 
India -0.58045 4.8011 1 0.0284 
Russia 1.23422 21.4447 1 <.0001 
Taiwan 0.26516 0.6701 1 0.4130 
USA -0.38398 2.9232 1 0.0873 
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Table 13/ GLM model for scores 
 Source DF FValue Pr>F 
Score CReside 9 3.72 0.0002 
R2=0.2180 NegoCase 1 0.93 0.3357 
 Gender 2 3.94 0.0200 
 HighExp 1 38.07 <.0001 
 Use 1 5.30 0.0218 
 InCtry 1 0.11 0.7369 
 OwnPSA 1 2.83 0.0932 
 OppPSA 1 6.35 0.0121 
 OppRes 9 1.58 0.1180 
 OppHigh 1 0.01 0.9271 
 OppUse 1 6.06 0.0142 
 OppGen 2 0.40 0.6727 
 
We found that the users’ gender has 
significant impact on score at a level of sig-
nificance of about 2%. Interestingly, signifi-
cant gender differences occurred between male 
and female users, and not between users who 
declared their gender and those who did not. 
Female users had a significantly lower score 
(βF – βM = –5.52758, t = –2.76, p = 0.0060) 
than male users. Another weakly (but well 
below the 5% level) significant effect is related 
to system use, of the supported user (β = 
0.73066, t = 2.30, p = 0.0218) and her/his op-
ponent (β = –0.81556, t = –2.46, p = 0.0142). 
As could be expected, system use by the nego-
tiator improved the results, while system use 
by the opponent had a negative impact on 
score.  
Higher problem solving attitude of the 
opponent also has a positive influence on the 
results a negotiator can achieve (β = 2.67131, 
t = 2.52, p = 0.0121). Similar results were 
found by (Graham, Mintu and Rogers 1994; 
Graham and Mintu-Wimsatt 1997), although 
in these studies a positive relation was only 
confirmed for some countries.   
Concerning the impact of culture on 
scores, it is interesting to compare the parame-
ter estimates of the impact of the negotiator’s 
culture to that of the opponent. For example, 
for Canada, there is a consistent impact in both 
directions: while negotiators from Canada per-
formed significantly worse than negotiators 
from other countries, their opponents also 
achieved a better score. On the other hand, no 
such phenomenon is visible for negotiators 
from Ecuador, who themselves perform better 
but had no negative impact on their opponent’s 
results. 
Apart from the score, another important 
outcome dimension concerns the question 
whether an agreement was achieved at all (in 
the primary negotiation phase or the post-
settlement phase). Out of the 1366 cases ana-
lyzed in this study, 947 (= 69.3%) reached an 
agreement, 419 (= 30.7%) did not.  
Table 15 presents the results of a logis-
tic regression on the binary variable indicating 
whether an agreement was reached at all. The 
problem solving attitude of the negotiator 
(Maximum likelihood β = 0.9266) and the 
opponent (Maximum likelihood β = 1.0770) 
are both positively related to the probability of 
an agreement. Culture as a whole did not have 
a significant impact. At the individual country 
level, users from India reached an agreement 
less often (Maximum likelihood β = –0.8987, 
Table 14. Parameter estimates for the impact of culture on results 
 Country of negotiator Country of opponent 
 Estimate t Value Pr > |t| Estimate t Value Pr > |t| 
Austria -2.16208 -0.50 0.6179 -1.24235 -0.30 0.7659 
Canada -7.67744 -3.50 0.0005 5.01128 2.42 0.0159 
Germany -2.84915 -0.87 0.3867 2.55430 0.66 0.5122 
Ecuador 11.99152 3.86 0.0001 0.16487 0.05 0.9600 
Finland -0.48770 -0.15 0.8802 -0.47360 -0.14 0.8898 
Hong Kong -3.10307 -0.70 0.4871 1.00431 0.17 0.8643 
India 5.95276 2.03 0.0432 -4.26779 -1.21 0.2260 
Russia 4.89893 1.12 0.2644 -2.31780 -0.54 0.5904 
Taiwan -3.74197 -0.94 0.3490 4.34905 0.90 0.3699 
USA -2.82180 -1.16 0.2455 -4.78227 -1.98 0.0487 
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Table 15. Factors influencing the probability to reach an agreement (Logistic regression) 
 DF Wald Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
Creside 9 10.5118 0.3107
NegoCase 1 0.4586 0.4983
Gender 2 2.7774 0.2494
HighExp 1 0.0017 0.9675
Use 1 4.4866 0.0342
InCtry 1 0.0235 0.8783
OwnPSA 1 38.4268 <.0001
OppPSA 1 46.4573 <.0001
OppRes 8 4.1836 0.8402
OppHigh 1 0.2929 0.5884
OppUse 1 0.0177 0.8941
OppGen 2 0.0375 0.9814
 
χ2 = 4.9639, p = 0.0259) than others, while for 
users from Finland, there is a weak positive 
effect (Maximum likelihood β = 1.0815 
χ2 = 2.9503, p = 0.0859). 
Synthesis of results 
Following a grounded theory approach 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967), we summarize the 
results of our empirical analyses in an influ-
ence matrix in order to draw a more holistic 
picture of the relationships found. We use this 
approach to generate ideas and propositions in 
this new field of research, where theory still 
has to be developed (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
In the table shown in Appendix 2, we list the 
dependent variables in the columns, the rows 
represent independent variables. Taking into 
consideration the exploratory character of this 
research, we also include weak influences sig-
nificant only at the 5% or 10% level. 
The independent variables, which we 
have considered in our analysis, can be sepa-
rated into two groups: on one hand, there are 
individual characteristics like gender or the 
role in the negotiation, and on the other hand 
culture as a collective variable. According to 
our results, problem solving attitude must be 
considered as part of the first group and thus as 
an individual characteristic of the negotiator, 
rather than a culture-dependent characteristic.  
This independence of PSA from culture 
is in striking difference to the hypotheses and 
results of previous research. Especially the 
earlier work of Graham and his colleagues 
suggested a direct influence of culture on prob-
lem solving attitude (Graham, Mintu and 
Rogers 1994; Graham and Mintu-Wimsatt 
1997). In a later study this position was revised 
and PSA was shown to be linked not to per-
sonal characteristics, but to organizational 
characteristics and to perceptions the negotia-
tor has about the behavior of his opponent (Ca-
lantone, Graham and Mintu-Wimsattt 1998). 
These contradictory findings could be ex-
plained by different methods by which PSA 
was measured. Whereas in previous studies 
PSA was measured with self reported items, 
Calantone, Graham et al. (1998) used percep-
tions of the opponent to measure a negotiator’s 
PSA.  
Consistent with our findings, PSA may 
be far more determined by situational charac-
teristics (i.e. organizational constraints, behav-
ior of the opponent, etc.) than by the culture of 
the negotiator. This argument is also supported 
by the finding of our study that the disclosure 
of identity was directly linked to the percep-
tion of the problem solving attitude. However, 
the weak fit of our models leaves the possibil-
ity of other, still unknown factors, open. Dis-
closing private information such as the identity 
during negotiations can be interpreted as a 
relationship and trust building measure, which 
positively affects perception of opponents dur-
ing computer-mediated negotiation.  
Another indirect support for the inde-
pendence of PSA from culture is provided by 
data from the post negotiation questionnaire, 
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where negotiators also indicated their guess of 
the country of residence of their opponent. 
Only 40.56% of all negotiators provided such 
a guess, and of those, only 35.62% were cor-
rect. This includes the cases in which the op-
ponent reportedly disclosed his or her country, 
but even then 40% of all guesses were incor-
rect. In total, only 14.42% of the negotiators 
had correctly guessed their opponent’s country 
at the end of the negotiation. This result seems 
to indicate that behavior during the negotiation 
provided only weak clues concerning the 
country of the opponent, or that our subjects 
were not able to interpret the clues that were 
available correctly, or both. 
In summary, PSA thus must be consid-
ered as an individual and process-related factor 
in the negotiations we analyzed, and not as a 
cultural factor. However, compared to the 
other individual factors, it had a considerable 
impact on behavior of negotiators and on the 
outcomes. The positive influence of PSA on 
scores, for both the negotiator exhibiting high 
PSA and his or her opponent, is consistent 
with the results of other (face-to-face) negotia-
tion experiments (Graham, Mintu and Rogers 
1994; Graham and Mintu-Wimsatt 1997). 
However, it is not highly significant in our 
situation of Web-based negotiations. 
Another interesting result is the signifi-
cant negative relationship between PSA and 
communication behavior of negotiators. At a 
first glance, this result contradicts intuition. 
But it should be kept in mind that communica-
tion behavior as we measured it here is con-
cerned only with the number of offers and 
messages, and not with their content. Thus, a 
negotiator with high PSA, who makes substan-
tial contributions in each round, can well 
achieve better results in fewer iterations and 
thus send fewer messages than an uncoopera-
tive negotiator, who repeats the same position 
again and again without making concessions. 
Yet another individual characteristic of 
negotiators had considerably less impact on 
the process and results. Gender had only low 
impact on the dependent variables; the only 
effect that was significant at the 1% level 
linked gender to reservation scores. While 
there were marked differences in expectations 
for negotiators who were assigned different 
roles, these differences vanish in the negotia-
tion process and results. 
Culture had a significant effect on most 
dependent variables at an aggregate level. 
Only one variable, the probability of agree-
ment, showed no impact of culture at all, and 
the impact on the opponent’s score was only 
weakly significant. At a more disaggregated 
level of individual countries, it is more diffi-
cult to obtain a clear and consistent picture or 
to identify specific cultural traits that might 
lead to the patterns we observed. Reading the 
table column by column, certain patterns 
emerge. Users who had higher expectations 
also tended to make more offers and, in the 
case of Ecuador, also achieved higher scores. 
But the relationship between higher expecta-
tions and communication involves such di-
verse cultures as Finland, Ecuador and Tai-
wan.  
While expectations concerning the out-
comes are similar across very different cul-
tures, expectations concerning friendliness are 
more readily interpretable in terms of cultures, 
with both Asian and North American cultures 
expecting less friendly negotiations than Euro-
peans and South Americans. Similarly, we find 
a more frequent use of free text messages with 
Asian users. This might be related to the need 
to establish context via messages for users 
from high context cultures. For negotiation 
outcomes, the pattern is again less consistent. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
In this study, we tried to identify effects 
of culture on anonymous negotiations con-
ducted via a technical medium. When first 
confronted with this research agenda, one 
might consider it to be a contradiction in itself. 
Is there any possibility left for cultural differ-
ences to manifest themselves when most obvi-
ous signs of culture like the physical distance 
people try to keep, facial expressions, gestures, 
manners, etc. are removed?  
Artefacts and behavioral patterns are 
present at the surface level and are the most 
obvious manifestations of culture, but they are 
the result of the underlying cultural traits at the 
level of values, norms and attitudes. Research 
on cross-cultural negotiations concentrates on 
studying more complex cultural constructs 
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than the superficial ones. Anonymous negotia-
tions might help to uncover these underlying 
factors. In face-to-face negotiations, subjects 
may modify their behavior and attitudes ac-
cording to their perceptions of the counter-
parts’ culture. In anonymous negotiations, 
participants cannot rely on these clues and thus 
are more likely to base their behavior on 
scripts inherent to their own culture.  
Our study shows that cultural differ-
ences exist in the way negotiators approach the 
negotiation, particularly in the expectations 
they form before the actual bargaining begins. 
We can observe that even a narrow-band tech-
nical communication medium is rich enough 
for cultural and behavioral differences to 
emerge in the negotiation process. These dif-
ferences, however, do not carry over into bar-
gaining strategies, attitudes, and outcomes to 
the extent we hypothesized. The question re-
mains open whether this indicates a point 
where we have reached the limits of the me-
dium and significant differences would have 
emerged if we had used richer communication 
media. It is also possible that the decision-
analytic and other tools built in NSS either 
flatten the impact of different strategies and 
attitudes or direct its users to a similar strategy. 
Alternatively, one could also put forward that 
strategies and attitudes depend more on the 
individual differences than on the culture, or 
that the impact of the cultural differences de-
creases during the information exchange proc-
ess. 
The analyses we have presented in this 
paper are based on a unique set of data, be-
cause of its size and global dispersion of par-
ticipants in Inspire negotiations. The drawback 
of the data collection is a limited ability to 
control the experiments. This work is the first 
step in research on the impact of national cul-
tures on the Internet-based communication and 
negotiation processes. Internet allows to in-
clude participants from all over the world in 
such experiments, but it also severely limits 
the possibility to control access to the system 
and the processes one wants to study. Thus our 
research cannot, at the present stage, claim the 
level of validity that could be obtained in care-
fully controlled laboratory experiments. Nev-
ertheless, we are confident that by analyzing 
the data collected so far, we were able to un-
cover interesting relationships, which can later 
be studied in detail in a more controlled 
environment. 
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APPENDIX 1: CONCEPTS AND VARIABLES 
Concept Variable Description Scale Data source Mean 
St. dev. 3 
CReside Country of residence Nominal Pre-negotiation 
questionnaire 
 Culture 





NegoCase Negotiator’s role: buyer 
or seller 
Binary Log files  
Gender Negotiator’s gender Nominal: Female, 

























M=2.8161     
S=0.8862 






M=2.4694     
S=0.9981 
OppExploit Perceived exploitative-





M=3.0497     
S=0.9542 
OppCoop Perceived cooperative-





M=2.7820     
S=1.1775 













EScore Expected score Metric 0-100 Pre-negotiation 
questionnaire 
M = 70.99 
S = 21.43 
RScore Reservation score Metric 0-100 Pre-negotiation 
questionnaire 
M = 46.17 
S = 24.72 
Expectation 






M = 3.6808 
S = 0.8442 
Ofr Number of offers sent Metric Log files M = 3.6977 
S = 2.0349 
OfrwMsg Number of offers with 
attached messages 
Metric Log files M = 3.3594 
S = 2.0052 
Process 
Msg Number of messages 
without offers 
Metric Log files M = 1.5073 
S = 1.6915 
Score Utility rating of final 
package 
Metric (0-100) Log files M = 66.77    S 
= 21.60 
Results 
Agr Status of agreement Binary Log files  
Derived variables  
 HighEx High expectations Binary True for  
EScore > 75 
 
 OppHigh High expectations  
of opponent 
Binary As above  
 Use Aggregate use of system Metric Sum of Ofr+ 
+OfrwMsg+Msg 
 
 OppUse Use of system by oppo-
nent 
Metric As above  
 InCtry Intra-country negotiation Binary True-parties from 
the same country 
 
                                                          
3 M = Mean;  
 S = Standard Deviation 
4 LS = Likert scale 
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APPENDIX 2: INFLUENCE TABLE 









Communic. offers & 
messages 
Agreement Own score Score of opponent
Country highly  
significant*** 












Russia  lower than  
average** 
higher than  
average*** 
disclosed more***     
Finland  higher than  
average~ 
lower than  
average~ 
disclosed less*** more offers** more agreements~   
Ecuador higher than  
average*** 
higher than  
average*** 
higher than  
average*** 
 more offers***  higher than  
average*** 
 
Taiwan  higher than  
average~ 
  more messages***    
Hong Kong   lower than  
average** 
     
India   lower than  
average*** 
disclosed less* Less offers*,  
more messages* 
less agreements* higher than  
average* 
 
USA lower than  
average*** 
 lower than  
average~ 
    lower than  
average* 
Canada   lower than  
average~ 
disclosed less***   lower than  
average*** 
higher than  
average* 
Germany lower than  
average*** 
lower than  
average*** 
 disclosed more*** less messages~    
Austria     less messages*    
Gender  higher for men** lower for men*    higher for men*  
Role higher for  
buyers*** 
higher for  
buyers*** 
      
PSA    disclosed more*** less offers***  
less messages*** 
 higher score~ higher score* 
High expecta-
tions 
   disclosed less~   higher score*  
System use      more agreements~ higher score* lower score* 
R2 0.106 0.043 0.110  0.079  0.218  
***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 ~p<.1 not tested     
  
 
